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contexts where previously well-established financial and banking systems have been 
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Restrictions on the banking sector are having a growing adverse impact on the flow of 
funds to humanitarian agencies. Assisting communities affected by humanitarian crises has 
also become much more difficult and costly in recent years due to the complex political and 
logistical turmoil in crisis zones (ODI, 2021). 
Delays and refusals of transactions by financial institutions or outright bank account 
closures worsen humanitarian crises by delaying aid distribution response times. The 
inability to channel funds and critical financial services into countries in humanitarian crisis (for 
example, due to restrictions on fund transfers, disruptions in banking and financial systems, etc.) 
prevents life-saving humanitarian assistance from reaching those who need it most. In the 
absence of legal transfer channels, the financing vacuum is often filled by illicit means, which 
can facilitate the spread of crime and corruption (ODI, 2021). 
Humanitarian organisations have turned to a variety of transaction channels (which are 
sometimes less transparent), given the major disruptions in legitimate transfer 
mechanisms. Without these alternative money transfer channels (e.g., hawala systems and 
mobile money operators), humanitarian organisations will have been unable to run some parts of 
their programming in countries like Syria, Somalia, and Yemen (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018b). 
These alternatives (sometimes desperate) means of obtaining funds will require 
humanitarian organisations to enter into less regulated financial agreements that are not 
subject to international standards. However, humanitarian agencies have fewer other options, 
given that they are facing serious financial difficulties. Disruptions in formal transfer channels 
(combined with lack of good alternative systems) are posing a threat to the delivery of help to 
communities in crisis zones – who are most in need of life-saving assistance (ODI, 2021). 
Brief summaries of some alternative financial transfer channels used by humanitarian actors – 
and their crisis contexts (discussed in Section 3, 4, and 5 of this report) are provided below: 
Myanmar:  
Transfer disruptions: humanitarian agencies are suffering from cash shortages due to transfer 
disruptions linked to the recent crisis (i.e., 2021 military coup). There are growing operational and 
financing restrictions on NGOs (e.g., Oxfam), bank closures (linked to debilitating riots), new 
stringent local banking regulations (especially against private banks), limits on cash withdrawals, 
some international transfer freezes (e.g., US), and suspension of programming and funding by 
donors (e.g., Japan).  
Alternative transfer channels: in this new crisis, humanitarian actors so far have limited 
alternative channels (such as mobile/online transfers and withdrawing small amounts of cash 
from ATMs) to access limited amounts of financing.  
Syria: 
Transfer disruptions: humanitarian actors have faced significant transfer challenges and 
disruptions, particularly linked to stringent transfer vetting, bank de-risking, counter-terrorist 
financing legislations, and international sanctions. NGOs and donors have difficulties in moving 





humanitarian agencies. There are also higher transaction costs linked to international financial 
transactions. 
Alternative transfer channels: NGOs and humanitarian agencies are resorting to alternative 
money transfer systems such as the ‘hawala’ system; partnering with international NGOs to 
facilitate financial transfers; complementing operations with “in-kind” relief schemes; making 
different programming and/or organisational adaptations to better deal with the transfer disruption 
and cash shortages. 
Palestine: 
Transfer disruptions: challenging regulatory requirements on international financial transfers, 
linked to anti-money laundering and combating terrorist financing, have caused considerable 
restrictions and disruptions to humanitarian activities by NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza. 
Major donors particularly feel that it is better and safer to work with other international NGOs 
instead of working with local NGOs. 
Alternative transfer channels: some local humanitarian actors and NGOs make financial 
transfers through non-transparent money transfer systems. Due to the relative difficulties of 
transacting in US dollars, humanitarian organisations alternatively use UK pounds or euros. 
Some NGOs also get registered in Europe so as to better access funds and link up with donors. 
Other alternatives, particularly by local NGOs, includes developing trust with local Palestinian 
organisations and using borrowed funds and other local resources. As elsewhere, humanitarian 
agencies have also made programming and/or organisational adaptations to endure the transfer 
disruptions. 
Yemen: 
Transfer disruptions: Bank transaction de-risking has had an adverse impact on humanitarian 
agencies. There are also caps on transaction size (i.e., cash withdrawals), sizeable exchange 
rate linked costs, and growing black-market activities. 
Alternative transfer channels: the main alternative transfer channel for humanitarian agencies 
has been to use Yemeni money brokers (i.e., sarafeen). Although, this indirectly further weakens 
the formal banking systems and boosts black market trade. Other solutions include programme 
adaptations – e.g., around cash programming, where donors try to balance its effectiveness with 
the reality of limited options for cash transfers. 
Somalia: 
Transfer disruptions: like the above-listed countries, humanitarian actors in Somalia face 
stringent transfer restrictions – i.e., linked to de-risking measures by banks. Disruptions in 
transfers make it difficult for humanitarian agencies working within the country to receive 
financing via formal banking system in a timely manner.   
Alternative transfer channels: because of the transfer restrictions and disruptions, 
humanitarian actors rely on money transfer operators; mobile banking; dedicated programmes 
and efforts to strengthen strict compliance rules by banks; and also adapting relief programming 





Overall, there is a relatively limited evidence base on how donors and humanitarian agencies use 
alternative non-bank financial transfer systems to channel humanitarian transactions – i.e., when 
well-established (traditional) financial and banking systems get disrupted by sudden shocks. As 
such, the evidence gathered from countries facing a humanitarian crisis (i.e., recent examples 
from Myanmar, Syria, Palestine, Yemen, and Somalia) described in Section 3, 4 and 5 are not 
systematically selected. Rather, the selection follows rapid reviews of available literature on (i) 
recent/ongoing humanitarian crisis incidents, Myanmar being purposefully included; ii) availability 
of some evidence on how donors and NGOs dealt with disruptions to financial transfers linked to 
a crisis; and (iii) following literature leads from key pieces of evidence and research projects.  
The rest of the report is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes humanitarian crises and 
the associated disruptions to financial transfers (banking systems) they entail. Section 3 
discusses the recent Myanmar crisis (i.e., 2021 Coup), the banking/transfer disruptions therein, 
how this affects humanitarian activities, what few alternative transfer options are being utilised by 
humanitarian actors so far. Section 4 looks at different cases of transfer disruptions and their 
impacts in crises contexts in other countries, namely Syria, Palestine, Yemen, and Somalia. 
Section 5 provides alternative and creative (sometimes unconventional and less transparent) 
channels for financial transactions that have been adopted by humanitarian actors – i.e., during 
disruptions of normal banking activities in the above-listed countries and territories. Section 6 
summarises some of the key recommendations suggested by the literature to improve financial 
transfers in humanitarian crises circumstances. 
 
2. Humanitarian crises and disruptions to financial 
transfers (banking systems) 
2.1 Defining ‘humanitarian crisis’ 
The term ‘humanitarian crisis’, as used in this report, adopts the typical definition by humanitarian 
actors – that is “an event or series of events that represents a critical threat to the health, safety, 
security or wellbeing of a community or other large group of people, usually over a wide area” 
(Tuzzolino et al., 2016: 14; Humanitarian Coalition, 2021). 
2.2 Humanitarian crises and bank/transaction disruptions 
Crisis induced disruptions to the transfer of humanitarian funds (e.g., into areas deemed 
to be high-risk, both for banks and for humanitarian organisations) have led to heightened 
due diligence requirements by banks and major donors. They have also led to extensive 
security checks on local humanitarian actors and implementing partners as well as greater 
government scrutiny of national and regional aid organisations (Fowler, 2005; McMahon, 2007; 
Gordon and El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018). 
Banks have become deeply suspicious in their dealings with NGOs and humanitarian 
organisations in countries engulfed by security crises. At times, accounts have been closed, 
and transactions have been delayed or blocked. These financial transfer disruptions within the 
formal international financial system have had the unintended effect of forcing greater amounts of 
funds through informal transfer channels, including money transfer networks like the ‘hawala’ 





For the humanitarian sector, “de-risking” by banks in crisis-affected countries and 
regions has become a major challenge. De-risking refers to the process where financial 
institutions are terminating relationships with ‘high-risk’ clients and closing their accounts. Money 
transfer service businesses, non-profit organisations, and correspondent banks have been 
observed de-risking, resulting in account closures – for example, in the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and Australia (Durner and Shetret, 2015). 
When de-risking is extensively implemented (i.e., particularly against local humanitarian 
actors), it could further isolate vulnerable communities from the global financial system. 
De-risking is exacerbated by low profit, reputation damage concerns, and increased anti-money 
laundering and counter-terrorist financing scrutiny (Durner and Shetret, 2015). 
 
3. Myanmar crisis (2021 Coup) and banking disruptions 
3.1 Crisis context 
Prior to the coup in early February 2021, nearly a million people in Myanmar depended on 
humanitarian aid. This number includes approximately 330,000 people who have been 
displaced in the country’s different conflict zones. About 100,000 people are also thought to have 
been displaced in conflicts in northern Shan and Kachin states. These internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) were heavily dependent on cash aid, prior to the current crisis. The post-coup 
financing and cash transfer disruptions, therefore, are going to make it difficult for humanitarian 
agencies to help these communities (Loy, 2021).1 
According to the UN World Food Programme, the near-collapse of the local banking sector, 
slowdown of remittances, and widespread cash shortages are exacerbating the problems 
of rising food and fuel prices. This is likely to increase the demand for humanitarian 
assistance. It is believed that the current political unrest has already started to adversely impact 
supply chains and markets (Nikkei Asia, 2021; Loy, 2021; Robinson and Wallace, 2021). 
 
3.2 Growing (humanitarian) financial transfer disruptions 
The World Bank has halted payments on withdrawal requests that were made after the coup 
for projects in the country. Further, funds worth 1 billion US Dollars were quickly frozen by 
U.S. (which are held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York), as Myanmar’s military rulers 
were attempting to move it shortly after seizing power (Nikkei Asia, 2021). Japan, a major 
donor, is also considering halting new official development aid to the country for the 
“foreseeable future”. This is linked to the growing global outcry and pressure over the February 
1st coup and ensuing deadly crackdown on protesters by the military (Kato and Mizorogi, 2021; 
Nikkei Asia, 2021). 
 
1 Over the years, ethnic armed groups have fought each other or fought against the country's military - which is 
now responsible for the coup. Since the beginning of February 2021, new conflicts have displaced over 3,000 





Nevertheless, some international aid organisations that had initially halted operations 
following the coup have now resumed operations, though they are still reliant on 
unpredictable government approvals. Local humanitarian partners are momentarily not reliant 
on government approval, but they are constrained by cash shortages (i.e., partly linked to 
transfer disruptions), fresh fighting, and the fear of being caught up in security crackdowns by the 
military (Loy, 2021). 
Humanitarian organisations fear that disruptions in cash transfers and cash shortages 
could lead to a bigger issue as available financing eventually dries up. Several 
humanitarian agencies are already facing difficulties to pay salaries of staff, apart from 
programming and operational disruptions. On the other hand, humanitarian actors based in 
border areas rely relatively less on Myanmar’s banking sector even prior to the coup. Thus, they 
have been able to maintain cash transfers and assistance to communities displaced in southeast 
Myanmar recently (Loy, 2021). 
 
3.3 Disruptions linked to new stifling NGO and banking regulations  
There are new restrictive orders (issued by the military regime, known as the State 
Administration Council (SAC)) to target specific NGOs, such as the Oxfam, the International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems, and Open Society Myanmar – a list that could grow further. 
The order warns all banks doing business with these NGOs (e.g., holding bank accounts) to 
carry out a financial account audit and give away the details of the audit to the authorities 
(Robinson and Wallace, 2021). 
Commercial banks have also been ordered to disclose wide-ranging financial details of 
NGOs – including specific bank accounts and transactions or money transfers dating all 
the way back to 2016. This affects both international and local NGOs operating in the 
country. This discrete financial directive was issued by the Central Bank of Myanmar (Robinson 
and Wallace, 2021). 
The military regime is exerting pressure on private banks in a variety of ways. Forced 
transfer of private deposit accounts to military-controlled banks is one of the threats. This is, 
unfortunately, hastening a reversal of the economic reforms started a decade ago (Robinson and 
Wallace, 2021). 
 
3.4 Disruptions linked to bank closures 
Banks estimate their average staffing levels to be around 20% to 30% of the pre-coup 
period. Bank closures have become common – as bank employees join the growing civil 
disobedience movement throughout the country. Low staffing has forced most banks to close 
their severely understaffed branches, even though many banks have tried to keep ATMs 
operations running (Robinson and Wallace, 2021). 
Commercial banks find themselves in a tight spot since they face pressure from all sides.  
• On the one hand, the regime (SAC) and Myanmar’s central bank, demand them to 





Following this, some commercial banks are demanding their employees to return to work. 
The orders to force banks to reopen their branches implies the growing unease by the 
SAC Government, with the worsening crisis in Myanmar’s financial system and quick 
slide into a wider economic crisis (Robinson and Wallace, 2021). 
• On the other hand, there is the civil disobedience movement that wants them to remain 
closed. Banks that want to open are subjected to “social shaming” by protesters on social 
media (Robinson and Wallace, 2021). 
 
3.5 Alternative channels for banking and financial transfers: 
The mass demonstrations have essentially shut down Myanmar’s banking sector, making 
it much more difficult to transfer money into or out of the country, according to frontline 
aid organisations (Loy, 2021). 
Humanitarian organisations and other stakeholders are increasingly relying on digital 
banking and ATM networks to access and transfer cash, given the disruptions in normal 
banking operations. However, banks are having trouble restocking ATMs with cash – due to the 
widespread chaos. The central bank of Myanmar has also reduced cash withdrawals from ATMs 
to only 500,000 kyats (USD 350) per day as from March 1st, 2021 and corporate account 
withdrawals to the equivalent of USD 14,000 per week.  
The difficulty to move cash (and the ever-dwindling stock of cash at hand) has made it very 
challenging for private businesses (including foreign investors) – as well as humanitarian 
organisations – to pay their employees in Myanmar (Robinson and Wallace, 2021). 
  
4. Beyond Myanmar: Impacts of disruptions to financial 
transfers in crises contexts 
4.1 Syria 
For aid agencies seeking to transfer money for humanitarian purposes into Syria, the 
ongoing crisis has severely limited and complicated their options. The combination of 
counter-terrorism financing (CTF) legislation and international sanctions has made moving and 
accessing funds extremely hard for humanitarian organisations. The US, the European Union, 
and other countries have imposed sanctions on Syria’s biggest banks. Further, in places that are 
outside government control, the banking system has basically been destroyed (Gordon et al., 
2021).2 
Gordon et al. (2018b) discovered that bank de-risking has decreased the cash available to 
NGOs by at least 35 percent at any given time, and that these funds are inaccessible for longer 
periods of time (for three to five months, they argue) than the situation before. 
 





Gordon et al. (2018b) note that the main difficulties faced by humanitarian organisations have to 
do with:  
• transferring cash via the correspondent banking system;  
• the adverse effects of banks closing accounts;  
• expanded and unpredictable due diligence requirements;  
• bigger transaction costs linked to international financial transactions;  
• the unfavourable interaction between CTF legislation and neighbouring states’ legislative 
and regulatory arrangements (e.g., Turkey) or problems of political economy (e.g., 
Lebanon), and  




Financial access and clearance of transactions are blocked for Palestinian NGOs at 
international, regional, and local levels:  
• Internationally: restrictions on the flow of funds to NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza 
have been imposed due to regulatory requirements, especially in the areas of anti-
money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing. This is due to the fact that 
several Western and Middle Eastern countries consider Hamas, which took control of 
Gaza after elections in 2006, to be a terrorist organisation. 
• Regionally: to prevent any reputational risks associated with Hamas’ presence, some 
Arab governments have imposed limits on the flow of funds to Palestinian NGOs. 
• Locally: the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah and Hamas in Gaza impose 
administrative and bureaucratic burdens on local organisations, including humanitarian 
agencies and NGOs (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018a).  
Therefore, major donors feel that it is safer to work with other international NGOs 
than with local NGOs – since they keep facing problems in receiving donations and 
grants. Competition, especially from implementing UN agencies, is another factor that is 
causing foreign grants (e.g., from major bilateral donors) to be diverted to international 
NGOs. Wide-ranging banking laws and regulatory burdens also mean that Palestinian 
NGOs, especially in Gaza, are unable to take the lead on development programmes and 
humanitarian projects or in mobilising ‘best-positioned’ organisations to respond to specific 
emergency needs of their community (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018a).  
 
4.3 Yemen 
In Yemen, bank transaction de-risking has had disastrous consequences for the 
country’s humanitarian sector. International financial transfers to Yemen from US or 
European banks have been slowed or stopped entirely. Local transactions with the World Bank 





organisations. This includes local humanitarian organisations and NGOs (El Taraboulsi-
McCarthy and Cimatti, 2018). 
De-risking has also led to a preference for transactions with individuals rather than 
organisations, according to humanitarian groups in Yemen. Some humanitarian 
organisations have noticed that high-profile businesspeople are able to clear transactions while 
NGOs are unable to do so (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy and Cimatti, 2018). 
Caps on transaction size: as per NGOs working in Yemen, it has not been easy to obtain 
sufficient cash to purchase items for humanitarian assistance (i.e., from local traders) due to 
a bank policy that does not permit the withdrawal of more than USD 5,000 out of a Yemeni 
bank account. NGOs note that it has been hard to make an exception to this rule, even for 
humanitarian activities.  
Exchange rate issues: oftentimes, major donors (such as the United Nations) transfer 
funding to Yemen in US dollars. However, the transfer is received by beneficiaries (e.g., 
NGOs in Yemen) in local currency. One US dollar, for instance, is worth around 250 Riyals 
on paper. On the currency market, however, it is worth about 325 Riyals. The Riyal was 
finally floated by the Central Bank of Yemen, which the NGOs say somewhat reduced the 
discrepancy between official and market rates. Nevertheless, there is still a notable liquidity 
problem, i.e., scarcity of hard cash for humanitarian actors (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy and 
Cimatti, 2018). 
Intensification of black-market activities: bank transaction de-risking, and the consequent 
restrictions on legitimate transactions, has contributed to the creation of a black-market trade, 
and the expansion of other cash transfer routes that rely on networks of unregulated and 
potentially corrupt money brokers:  
• Many humanitarian groups argue that bank de-risking in Yemen has opened the 
door to corruption, as the lack of a functional traditional banking system has 
promoted the growth of other (alternative) money transfer channels that rely on 
unregulated and (sometimes corrupt) networks of money brokers and hawala 
systems (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy and Cimatti, 2018). 
• Humanitarian aid can also sometimes make its way into the black market. For 
example, to meet immediate cash needs (i.e., because of Yemen’s liquidity crisis), 
beneficiaries may sell relief items (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy and Cimatti, 2018). 
 
4.4 Somalia 
Somalia’s financial sector, which has been beset by internal and external challenges for 
decades, faces both internal and external challenges, all of which have significant 
consequences for local humanitarian actors (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018b): 
• Internally: the financial sector is trapped between a small and relatively poor formal 
banking sector and dominant private money transfer firms. 
• Externally: the implementation of counter-terrorism measures and banking legislation 
has resulted in transactions being postponed or frozen, and bank accounts being closed 





These limitations on financial transactions (particularly bank de-risking measures) make 
it difficult for local humanitarian organisations to obtain transactions through the formal 
banking system in a timely manner. They also prevent money transfer operators from serving 
as a viable source of financial access and remittances from the Somali diaspora (El Taraboulsi-
McCarthy, 2018b).  
International humanitarian and development organisations also complain that the difficulties in 
making transfers to local relief organisations in Somalia is causing considerable “operational 
difficulties” – thus, limiting their ability to respond quickly to humanitarian demands (El 
Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018b): 
• A complex web of intermediary banks and un-traceability of transactions: When 
humanitarian organisations send money to their partner agencies in Somalia, the 
procedure is often convoluted, as transfers pass through many intermediary banks before 
being stopped. Since humanitarian organisations do not know whether the transfers were 
stopped at the source bank or the intermediary bank, it’s difficult for them to track it down 
(El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018b). 
• Extended delays in processing transactions: Some NGOs also say that, even though 
their bank accounts were not closed, transactions were often delayed or frozen for no 
apparent reason. Delays were normal, according to some NGOs, with some experiencing 
delays of up to 20 times (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018b). 
• Delays have hampered the ability of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and local 
humanitarian actors (particularly Islamic relief organisations) to respond. Since 
humanitarian organisations are often called upon to respond to conflict and natural 
disasters, the consequences are dire (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018b). 
• Bank de-risking limits transparency and access to formal banking: Bank de-risking 
has added another layer of difficulty for local humanitarian organisations already facing 
serious challenges in accessing international humanitarian donors. Uncertainty about the 
legal consequences of any form of interaction with Al-Shabaab (i.e., terrorist 
organisation) persists – even concerning meeting humanitarian needs (El Taraboulsi-
McCarthy, 2018b). 
 
5. Case studies: alternative channels for financial 
transactions during humanitarian crisis 
4.1 Syria 
Humanitarian actors and NGOs have resorted to various alternative transfer channels and 
coping mechanisms to deal with limited financial access, in the face of transfer restrictions by 
banks.  
Resorting to alternative money transfer system (hawala):  
The hawala scheme has made it much easier and safer to transfer cash across conflict zones. 
However, several NGOs in Syria note that the hawala system was also by far the most difficult 
strategy to explain to banks, even if major (western) donors were generally aware of what was 





Some of Syria’s larger NGOs tried to properly identify their hawala operators, supplier 
firms, and partner entities within the country. The identification of these “safe groups and 
partners” helped humanitarian agencies to safely maintain long-term relationships, easing costly 
scrutiny of transactions by banks. The finance directors of NGOs also made sure that they got 
receipts for each transaction. Knowing the identities of those involved in the transaction 
network particularly pleased banks – thus, reducing transfer restrictions and blockages 
(Gordon et al., 2018). 
Partnering with western/international NGOs to facilitate transfers: 
Transactions involving money from European international NGOs are much more likely to pass 
through the international financial system than donations from somewhere else – e.g., such as 
the Middle East (Gordon et al., 2018). 
Resorting to “in-kind” relief schemes:  
Several smaller NGOs have also used their own version of hawala systems to exchange in-kind 
relief goods and currency. While this administrative mechanism enabled humanitarian 
organisations to pay for cash transactions as if they were in-kind donations, the audit trail was 
clearly obfuscated. In some cases, NGOs actually disguised cash movements by requesting in-
kind humanitarian assistance (e.g., food parcels). NGOs used the hawala scheme to transfer 
money as well, but they prepared receipts that looked like food baskets. These (in-kind) resource 
exchanges are made both within NGO networks and between larger and more developed NGOs’ 
country offices (Gordon et al., 2018). 
Programming and/or organisational adaptations: 
NGO priorities have shifted in a subtle but noticeable way as they systematically moved away 
from funding cash-based initiatives to prevent delays in the flow of funds (Gordon et al., 2018), 
even though cash-based programmes were often seen as key enablers for activities that had the 
potential to support the most marginalised communities in conflict zones (Gordon et al., 2018; 
Derzsi-Horvath et al., 2017). 
Humanitarian organisations and NGOs have had to change their programming due to significant 
disruptions to the conventional banking system in Syria, i.e., since the conflict. Many 
humanitarian actors have since shifted their focus away from cash-based programs and toward 
in-kind assistance. Because banks often block money when it has a large cash portion to be 
spent within Syria, NGO’s have been forced to abandon cash programming. These restrictions 
have, for example, made it nearly impossible for NGOs to buy fuel or pay salaries to local 
workers (Gordon et al., 2018). 
Syrian NGOs and humanitarian actors that succeed in moving transactions appeared to be 
those that: 
• are the largest, most established, and those that had developed strong sub-
contracting relationships (especially with major European NGOs); 
• who made the most conservative programming decisions;  
• who had invested heavily in “compliance” activities and operated in more secure 





Humanitarian actors and NGOs were able to avoid problem jurisdictions and transfer funding 
by: 
• working more strategically and by pre-planning for the movement of funds through the 
banking system;  
• making use of local networks and other internal budgets to discover alternative 
sources of funds; 
• building trust with banks; 
• encouraging donors to change the currencies being transferred (e.g., transacting in 
euro or sterling, rather than US dollars);  
• switching/exploring different banks and sending money through indirect banking 
routes; 
• transferring money in ‘numerous but smaller’ transactions – with each one potentially 
being routed through different institutions and countries; 
• transferring relief into programme areas through commodity-based assistance and 
cash-commodity exchanges with other NGOs (Gordon et al., 2018). 
There was no single method, however, that guaranteed financial transfer – and most of 
the above alternatives were still difficult to implement. For instance: 
• When exchanging money in euros there were still significant delays and requests for 
‘more’ information by banks, even though these requests were often less onerous than 
when dealing with transactions in dollars (Gordon et al., 2018).  
• Government donors and the UN, in general, would usually not allow money to be moved 
in any currency other than the one in which they did their business with, which often was 
US dollars (Gordon et al., 2018). 
• Sending money in smaller sums was time-consuming and inconvenient procedure for the 
NGOs. On one occasion, a Turkish NGO was forced to transfer stalled funds worth USD 
1.2 million (from its European donor) through several individual transactions totalling less 
than USD 50,000 (Gordon et al., 2018). 
Usually, international donors do not cover the fees associated with the subsequent 
(higher) currency exchange charges on international transfers. These fees are often borne 
by the recipient NGOs and humanitarian actors in the crisis country. Commission fees vary 
widely, ranging from 2.5 percent to 30 percent. Syrian NGOs have also stated attempting to 
open several bank accounts in order to avoid being de-risked by any of their banks, further 
increasing costs and staff time commitments. This was seen as having a significant impact on 
NGOs’ finances and program feasibility, particularly when combined with the costs of moving 
cash via Syria’s money transfer network (Gordon et al., 2018). 
 
4.2 Palestine 
Resorting to alternative money transfer system (opaque):  
Due to financial access limits, NGOs are forced to use less transparent networks to move funds. 





institutional bank accounts are blocked, this usually meant transactions with cash in hand or 
transfers to personal bank accounts of NGO workers. As a result, transactions were often made 
through an intermediary, such as a board member or another individual who could be trusted (El 
Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018a). 
To prevent delays, some Palestinian humanitarian organisations opened bank accounts for their 
project’s suppliers and contractors, allowing them to collect payments and wages directly rather 
than through NGOs (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018a). 
Curbing US dollar-based transactions (at a cost):  
Since making and obtaining transfers in US dollars is difficult, some humanitarian organisations 
have requested transfers in other currencies, such as the UK pound or the euro. Currency 
fluctuations, as previously stated, can result in financial losses, and can also cause uncertainty 
when project contracts are priced in US dollars. According to El Taraboulsi-McCarthy (2018a), 
one international humanitarian organisation lost around USD 50,000 when converting dollars to 
euros and then back to dollars – since all project contracts were in dollars. 
Registering NGOs in western countries:  
Some humanitarian organisations have registered in Europe in order to gain access to funds 
and donors, as well as to facilitate transactions between foreign banks and Palestinian banks. 
NGOs also found out that banks had fewer issues with their transfers when they worked through 
European-registered organisations (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018a). 
Developing trust with local organisations:  
Many local humanitarian actors seemed to depend on community cohesion and confidence as a 
safety net. The presence of confidence (e.g., between humanitarian NGOs and local suppliers) 
encourages local organisations (i.e., supplier businesses) to be patient and wait for delayed 
funds (i.e., NGO funds stuck in transit) to arrive and be deposited in local bank accounts (El 
Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018a). 
Using borrowed funds and local resources: 
Palestinian NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza have sometimes resorted to borrowed funds and 
local capital in the absence of financial access. Unfortunately, due to the scarcity of local capital, 
this is not a viable and scalable option (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018a).  
Programming and/or organisational adaptations: 
Due to the difficulties in sending funds to and from Gaza, humanitarian organisations have 
had to change their programming to accommodate the restrictions. This may result in 
changes to original programme priorities, timelines, programme scale and scope – or, in the 
worst-case scenario, lead to programme suspension (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018a). 
Donors regard cash assistance as especially risky in light of global counter-terrorism efforts, 





in how they use the money – including for unintended purposes (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 
2018a). 
4.3 Yemen 
Resorting to alternative money transfer system (money brokers/sarafeen or hawala):  
• It was noted that ‘sarafeen’ (Yemeni money brokers) have grown rapidly in response 
to restrictions on formal bank transactions – and have now become the primary 
source of cash distribution both locally and internationally. As a result, moving cash 
around without ‘sarafeen’ has become impossible for humanitarian organisations and 
other actors (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy and Cimatti, 2018). 
• Some humanitarian actors, nevertheless, note that illicit transactions in food and fuel 
are taking place in the black market often because of the weakening of the banking 
system (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy and Cimatti, 2018). 
Programming and/or organisational adaptations: 
Challenges to cash transfer programming: As a result of the de-risking process, 
humanitarian organisations’ ability to inject cash into Yemen has been restricted. Although 
evidence indicates that cash transfer programs can and should be prioritised in humanitarian 
crises, their full potential has yet to be realised. Cash programming encourages beneficiaries 
to prioritise their needs, and locally invested cash leads to market recovery and livelihood re-
establishment (IIED, 2016; El Taraboulsi-McCarthy and Cimatti, 2018). 
Local humanitarian organisations and communities are eventually figuring out how to work 
around de-risking and continue their humanitarian response operations – even in the face of 
adversity – by focusing on locally sourced funds and services, as well as thinking creatively 
about how to ensure that humanitarian aid reaches those in need (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy 
and Cimatti, 2018). 
 
4.4 Somalia 
Resorting to alternative money transfer system (money transfer operators and mobile 
banking):  
Because local humanitarian organisations are unable to rely on banks for their transactions, they 
are forced to switch to either money transfer operators (MTOs) or mobile banking. By one 
estimate, more than 70% of the Somali population uses unregulated mobile money, which is 
apparently effective. As a result, MTOs and mobile banking are critical components of the 
country’s humanitarian response (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018b). 
Based on her research and interviews with bankers, academics, and especially humanitarian 





• Money transfer businesses, mobile money, and other methods of financial transactions 
that are outside the formal banking system are crucial to the humanitarian response in 
Somalia.  
• The increasing acceptance of MTOs among the population may has undermined and 
weakened the Central Bank of Somalia – since it has no control over these non-bank 
money transfer businesses.     
• The majority of local and international MTOs seem to have adopted rigorous ‘Know Your 
Customer’ measures. Nevertheless, some local money transfer businesses have 
questionable transparency standards and have led to aid diversion (El Taraboulsi-
McCarthy, 2018b). 
Better compliance to stringent bank regulations:  
Many humanitarian organisations have improved their compliance standards or other internal 
processes to deal with bank de-risking (for security reasons) in order to prevent aid from being 
diverted (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018b; Modirzadeh, 2013).  
Some international humanitarian organisations have also discontinued the use of some MTOs 
(especially those with poor transparency standards) in order to promote greater financial and aid 
transparency. Nonetheless, since many local humanitarian organisations lack access to bank 
accounts, they are unable to efficiently use these funds (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018b).  
According to El Taraboulsi-McCarthy (2018b), a counter-terrorism regime that prioritises 
enforcement over humanitarian imperatives has an effect on local humanitarian organisations’ 
access to open, structured banking service. MTOs are the de facto banks in Somalia, according 
to humanitarian agencies. As such, the difficulty of transferring money externally via the 
formal/traditional banking system has forced humanitarian actors to work with MTOs. 
Programming and/or organisational adaptations: 
International humanitarian organisations in Somalia note that the majority of their cash 
programming is now done through hawala companies or MTOs with bank accounts in the United 
States, Europe, or the Gulf region, especially Dubai. As a result, if MTOs lose access to banking 
arrangements, their ability to implement cash transactions locally would be jeopardised (El 
Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018b).3 
Recent digital financial tools like cards and mobile-based money transfers have the potential to 
facilitate and expand cash delivery during humanitarian crises – while at the same time lowering 
management and security costs. They offer beneficiaries more power of how and when they 
spend their money than in-kind help. Nevertheless, pay-point infrastructure (including agents, 
merchants, and/or ATMs) is still needed. Account-based digital cash transfers could improve aid 
recipients’ financial participation by allowing them to establish a banking track record and 
allowing financial service providers to give them additional financial products as clients. Cash 
 
3 In order to cope with severe delays, some humanitarian organisations have called on Somalis in the diaspora to 
send funds through the hawala system, rather than through banks. Another alternative is to borrow money locally 





recipients’ ability and interest in using digital accounts, on the other hand, differs greatly across 
contexts (Tuzzolino et al., 2016). 
6. Further ways to improve financial transfers in 
humanitarian crises circumstances 
International humanitarian actors, according to El Taraboulsi-McCarthy and Cimatti (2018b), 
should take a holistic approach to crisis zones, combining humanitarian, economic, and 
security considerations rather than working in a fragmented manner. The crises in Yemen, 
Syria, and Somalia, for example, demonstrate the importance of a holistic approach to 
humanitarian relief, development, and security. 
Cash transfer programming may also be a way to connect the humanitarian response to a 
post-conflict reconstruction plan and the resumption of economic activities. To promote 
the flow of funds to meet humanitarian and economic reconstruction needs, a change in existing 
de-risking policy might be needed. A stronger and revamped Central Bank could function as a 
guarantee that funds are used for legal purposes (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy and Cimatti, 2018b). 
However, this will prove to be difficult in countries where the Central Bank has always been 
weak or incapacitated following major conflict incidents and market disruptions. 
El Taraboulsi-McCarthy (2018a) recommends that international NGOs (e.g., those in Europe) 
should join forces with NGOs from the global South to campaign for consistent financial 
legislation and flexible support for local humanitarian and development organisations. 
She claims that global pressure to resolve the negative implications of counter-terrorism and 
bank de-risking has yet to be meaningfully established. A coalition of organisations and 
foundations from the global North and South is needed to make a case for proportionately 
controlling the market, rather than in a manner that makes vulnerable people in crisis countries 
even more vulnerable. 
Gordon et al. (2018b) warn that much needs to be done to strike a better balance between i) 
properly vetting financial transfers and ii) the unintended humanitarian consequences of 
transfer disruptions – especially to the humanitarian sector.  
Gordon et al. (2018b) further note that humanitarian actors and banks widely agree on the 
reforms that could enhance the regulatory system’s effectiveness from both a humanitarian and a 
CTF viewpoint. Some of these reforms imply that: 
• Banks and NGOs agree on a code of conduct – regarding what constitutes sufficient 
compliance and transparency in terms of systems and recordkeeping, and the 
exemptions that are possible in the very difficult situations.  
• Banks approve a due diligence code of conduct on the types of regularly required types 
and what is considered ‘sufficient’ information. Banks make this code of conduct 
accessible to the humanitarian community.  
• Donors acknowledge the higher overhead costs associated with operating in countries in 
conflict and commit to cover these costs for local NGOs. 






• Hawala transfer channels are put on a clearer regulatory foundation in circumstances 
where they are the only viable options of moving money into areas of significant 
humanitarian need.  
• The creation of a mechanism for approving a list of acceptable or ‘safe’ organisations 
from which NGOs can purchase supplies and commodities, as well as with which they 
can conduct financial transactions.  
• The creation of an international humanitarian financial clearing system to complement the 
role of correspondent banks.  
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